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Experimental studies have shown the ubiquity of altruistic behavior in human so-
cieties. The social structure is a fundamental ingredient to understand the degree
of altruism displayed by the members of a society, in contrast to individual-based
features, like for example age or gender, which have been shown not to be relevant to
determine the level of altruistic behavior. We explore an evolutionary model aiming
to delve how altruistic behavior is affected by social structure. We investigate the dy-
namics of interacting individuals playing the Ultimatum Game with their neighbors
given by a social network of interaction. We show that a population self-organizes
in a critical state where the degree of altruism depends on the topology character-
izing the social structure. In general, individuals offering large shares but in turn
accepting large shares, are removed from the population. In heterogeneous social
networks, individuals offering intermediate shares are strongly selected in contrast
to random homogeneous networks where a broad range of offers, below a critical one,
is similarly present in the population.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
How cooperative behavior emerges among
interacting individuals is a long-standing
problem that has attracted, starting from
Darwin, the attention of a large number of
researches [8, 11, 29]. In the context of Game
Theory, different mechanisms and models
have been proposed to explain the observed
cooperative behavior, two prominent exam-
ples being the Ultimatum Game [12] and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma [3]. Theoretical studies,
have shown that, selection at the individual
level, may lead to altruistic behavior [31], in
contrast to the general belief that only group
selection can give raise to altruism.
Aiming at understanding the mechanisms
leading to altruism as the core of cooperative
behavior, the Ultimatum Game is one of the
paradigmatic theoretical games used to un-
derstand their interrelation. The simplicity
of this game has allowed to obtain a large set
of experimental results that clearly show the
presence of altruistic behavior, in the form
of altruistic punishment. Altruistic punish-
ment, meaning that individuals react to an
unfavorable action by an opponent although
the punishment is costly for them and yields
no material gain, is a key ingredient for the
†Electronic address: tessonec@ethz.ch;
URL: http://www.imedea.uib.es/~tessonec
explanation of cooperation as it emerges if al-
truistic punishment is possible, while breaks
down if it is ruled out [10]. The ultimatum
game consists of two agents, who have to
share a given amount of money. One of them,
the proposer, makes an offer on how to share
the money to the other agent, the responder.
The proposer can only make one offer. The
responder decides whether he accepts or re-
jects the offer. If the responder accepts, the
money is shared as proposed; otherwise, none
of them get anything. Given that a narrowly
rational responder would accept no matter
what he has been offered –something is bet-
ter than nothing–, a narrowly rational pro-
poser would offer to the responder the min-
imum amount. However, real agents behave
differently: offers are typically close to a 50-
50 ratio and offers below 20% are typically
rejected [17, 18, 24].
Recently, an extensive research performed
among small societies around the world [16]
has shown that social structure is a key el-
ement in determining the degree of cooper-
ation among its members [17, 18]. On the
one hand, individual-based features seem not
to be relevant in order to determine the de-
gree of cooperation. On the other hand, in
the Ultimatum Game, the proposals and re-
jection levels are different depending on the
social structure. For example, societies based
on cooperation and sharing of food, show
3higher offering levels. From the theoretical
point of view the effect of structured popula-
tions in social dilemmas, e.g., the prisoner’s
dilemma, public good games, or snowdrift
games, has been analyzed mainly from the
perspective of spatially extended populations
[14, 15, 22, 27]. In the simplest case, local in-
teractions are considered in regular lattices
where each individual interacts only within
its local neighborhood in contrast to global
random interactions considered in well mixed
populations. However, recent progress in this
area has shown that many social and biolog-
ical interaction networks are not regular, as
typically used in theoretical models, but dis-
play the small-world behavior and broad de-
gree distributions [1, 2, 13, 23, 28, 33].
The question we address here is precisely
how social structure affects the degree of al-
truistic behavior. This paper is organized
as follows: In the next Section we define
the evolutionary ultimatum game model in
a complex network. In Section III, follow-
ing the tradition of spatial games, we first
consider interactions given by a regular lat-
tice; later extending our analysis to random
and small-world networks, which are charac-
terized by single-scale degree distributions;
in Section IIIB, we also consider scale-free
networks. Finally we discuss our results and
draw the conclusions in Section IV.
FIG. 1: For each time step, a data point indi-
cates the threshold of the agent with the low-
est payoff. The population is composed of 104
agents who interact in a one-dimensional lattice.
II. THE MODEL
A set of N agents are arranged in the
nodes of a network. We set 1 unit the
amount to be shared in each interaction.
Each agent i is characterized by a threshold
Ti ∈ [0, 1]: as responder it indicates the min-
imum amount he will accept; as proposer, it
also defines the amount of money he will of-
fer. This situation is usually named as em-
pathy [30], and has been shown to enhance
fairness in some situations in the ultimatum
game [25, 26, 31]. Based on experimental
evidence reported previously, we will assume
that a fair offer-acceptance (threshold values
around 50%) represents altruistic behavior.
The model runs as follows: at each time
step all agents play with all their neighbors
4synchronously. Thus for each interaction link
between two neighboring agents (i, j),
• If the offer Ti is above the threshold of
agent j, Ti > Tj , then the offer Ti is ac-
cepted: agent j increases his payoff by
Ti while agent i’s payoff increases by
1− Ti. The payoff obtained by agent i
(j) from the interaction with his neigh-
bor j (i) is Πij = 1− Ti (Πji = Ti);
• Otherwise if the offer Tj is above the
threshold of agent i, Tj > Ti, then the
offer Tj is accepted: agent i’s payoff
increases by Tj while agent j’s payoff
increases by 1 − Tj . The payoff ob-
tained by agent i (j) from the interac-
tion with his neighbor j (i) is Πij = Tj
(Πji = 1− Tj).
The payoff obtained by agent i after inter-
action with the neighbors j in his neighbor-
hood V(i) is thus Πi =
∑
j∈V(i)Πij . In the
unlikely event that two neighboring agents
thresholds are the same, one of the offers is
selected and accepted at random. After each
round, a selection rule is applied to the sys-
tem: the agent with the lowest payoff in the
population and its immediate neighbors, de-
termined by the network, are replaced by new
agents with randomly chosen thresholds [5].
We then let the system evolve resetting the
payoffs of all agents to zero.
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FIG. 2: Distribution of thresholds for 104 agents
in a one-dimensional lattice (continuous line)
and in a random network (dashed line) after
4× 106 iterations. The dynamics selects thresh-
old values below the critical threshold Tc = 0.56
in the one-dimensional lattice and Tc = 0.88 in
the random network.
An alternative description of the model
could set the interaction between two agents
as a single event in which agent i acts as pro-
poser and j as responder. However as long
as the update is synchronous and every agent
plays as proposer and responder with all its
neighbors, this description and the dynamic
rules (i)-(ii) are equivalent.
III. RESULTS
A. Single-scale interaction networks
Following previous studies of spatial
games [20, 22, 32], we first consider a one-
5dimensional lattice where each agent inter-
acts with his two nearest neighbors. We have
run simulations for populations in the range
N = 103 to 104 agents, finding consistent re-
sults. The initial thresholds are randomly
selected from a uniform distribution in the
range [0, 1]. In Fig. 1 we display the threshold
of the agent with the lowest payoff in the pop-
ulation at each time step. Agents with high
and low thresholds are removed from the pop-
ulation. On the one hand, agents with high
thresholds make large offers that are likely to
be accepted by their neighbors, contributing
to the neighbors payoff. However quite un-
likely they receive large enough offers to be
accepted due to their high threshold. This
behavior can be illustrated calculating the ex-
pected payoff per interaction in a completely
mixed population,
〈Π(T )〉 = T (1− T ) +
1− T 2
2
. (1)
In the limiting case of agents with threshold
T = 1, they obtain on average a payoff close
to 0. On the other hand, the opposite situ-
ation is observed for agents with low thresh-
old: their offers are hardly accepted while
they accept most of the offers they receive.
In the limiting case of agents with thresh-
old T = 0, they obtain on average a payoff
close to 1/2 per neighbor. Thus agents with
low thresholds have in average a larger pay-
off than agents with high thresholds and are
able to survive. Although the previous ar-
gument has been obtained for a completely
mixed population, we observe that it is still
valid in the regular case (Fig. 2). Thus, af-
ter a transient, the distribution of thresholds
reaches a stationary distribution. Thresholds
above a critical value are removed from the
population. For the one-dimensional lattice
considered here, a critical threshold value is
obtained Tc = 0.56 ± 0.01. Below this criti-
cal value the distribution of thresholds is not
uniform: it increases approaching the critical
value. The payoff distribution also shows a
nonuniform distribution: only values above a
critical value Πc = 1.76 are found, displaying
a maximum at a value around Π ≃ 2.
The question we next address is whether
the ultimatum model self-organizes in a crit-
ical state. In order to characterize the dy-
namics, we have measured the distribution
of the distance ∆x between two consecutive
selection events, C(∆x), and the first return
time distribution, Pf(t), the time elapsed be-
tween two selection events affecting the same
agent. The results are plotted in Fig. 3. In
both cases the tails of the distributions are
well fitted by power-laws. For the spatial cor-
relation
C(∆x) ∼ ∆x−γ , (2)
with γ = 3.16 ± 0.1, and for the first return
time
Pf(t) ∼ t
−τ , (3)
6FIG. 3: First return time distribution for a sys-
tem of 104 agents in a one-dimensional lattice.
The solid line is a power-law fit with an exponent
α = 1.57. Inset: distribution of the distance
∆x between two agents getting the lowest pay-
off consecutively. The solid line is a power-law
fit with an exponent γ = 3.16.
with τ = 1.57.
These results suggest that the system self-
organizes in a critical state where the dis-
tribution of avalanches is also a power-law.
The critical state would emerge despite the
nonuniform distribution of thresholds (and
payoffs). An avalanche is typically defined as
follows: it starts when the lowest payoff gets
larger than a preset value Π∗ (close to the
critical payoff), and stops when it drops be-
low this value. The size, s, of an avalanche is
the number of time steps it lasts. In Fig. 4,
we show the distribution of avalanche sizes
when we use a payoff Π∗ = 1.76 as the indi-
cation of an avalanche. The probability dis-
FIG. 4: Avalanche size distribution P (s) a sys-
tem of 104 agents in a one-dimensional lattice
(circles) and in small-world networks (squares)
with a rewiring probability p = 0.15. The solid
lines is a power-law fit with an exponent α = 1.0
and α = 1.5, respectively. Inset: the avalanche
size distribution P T (s) considering the thresh-
olds instead of payoffs for the definition of an
avalanche in a one-dimensional lattice. The solid
line corresponds to the best exponential fit.
tribution displays a power-law decay
P (s) ∼ s−α, (4)
with an exponent α = 1.0.
It is worth noting that if we had used the
threshold value, T , as an indication of when
an avalanche starts and stops, the distribu-
tion of avalanches would have decayed expo-
nentially (see inset of Fig. 4). This behavior
reflects that the thresholds being removed are
not always above a critical value (as shown
in Fig. 1): agents with low thresholds are re-
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FIG. 5: (a) Distribution of payoffs and (b) distri-
bution of thresholds for 104 agents in a scale-free
network in the asymptotic state after 106 itera-
tions. The distributions are averaged over 100
realizations.
moved often from the population. Thus, the
fitness of an agent is given by its payoff.
Regular lattices are just a crude simpli-
fication of social and biological interaction.
More realistic models of interaction networks
include the small-world behavior: the aver-
age distance between agents in the network
is similar to the one obtained in a random
network, and the clustering, the fraction of
neighbors of an agent that are also neighbors
between them is large, as occurs in a regular
lattice. We have performed simulations in
small-world networks generated by rewiring
the links of a one-dimensional lattice, using
the algorithm introduced in Ref. [21] in or-
der to keep all the agents with the same
number of links: With a probability p, two
edges exchange their end nodes. The distri-
bution of thresholds and payoff are similar
to the one-dimensional lattice, as shown in
Fig. 2. It can be seen that for the limiting
case of a random network, the distribution
of thresholds is broader, and has a higher
critical threshold. In this case, the system
also self-organizes in a critical state where the
avalanche size distribution displays a power-
law scaling. Similarly to the one-dimensional
lattice, the avalanche size distribution (when
considering the threshold as the dynamical
variable) is not power-law, but exponential.
For the small-world networks, the distribu-
tion of avalanche size is also power-law with
an exponent that depends on the rewiring
probability p. For instance, for a system of
10, 000 agents we find an exponent α = 1.5,
for a value p = 0.15 (Fig. 4).
B. Scale-free interaction networks
In all the results presented so far, the net-
work of interactions is such that the number
of links of each node, its degree, is constant
for all the agents. Beyond the small-world
behavior, another important ingredient of in-
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FIG. 6: The cumulative distribution of
avalanches in a scale-free network with 104 (cir-
cles) and 2×104 agents. The distribution is well
fitted by a power-law with an exponential cut-
off. The solid line corresponds to a power-law
fit, leading to an exponent α = 1.62. The preset
payoff that defines when an avalanche starts and
ends is Π∗ = 1.77. Averages are obtained over
100 realizations.
teraction networks is that they often display
a scale-free degree distribution. We now turn
into the study of the results of this model
when the topology of interactions is not a reg-
ular one, but a scale-free one. As the model
for the generation of the network, we used the
Baraba´si-Albert algorithm [6, 7], generated
as follows: starting from a fully connected
network of size m, at time t a node is added,
and attached to m existing nodes, where the
probability to be attached to a node is pro-
portional to its degree. This algorithm gen-
erates networks with a power-law degree dis-
tribution with an exponent γ = 3. We have
fixed the value m = 2. Once the network is
grown, it is kept fixed and the dynamics is
played as indicated by rules (i) and (ii).
In Fig. 5(a) we plot the stationary distri-
bution of payoffs in the population. There
is a well defined critical payoff, below which
the agents are removed. This critical value
is Πc = 1.75 ± 0.02. For large payoffs, the
distribution decays as a power-law with an
exponent of 3, reflecting the decay of the
degree distribution of the network. For the
distribution of thresholds in the population
(Fig. 5(b)), there is not cutoff in this dis-
tribution. All thresholds in the range [0, 1]
are present, with a maximum in the distri-
bution around T ≃ 0.5. The distribution
is highly asymmetric: it approaches zero for
thresholds close to 1, while it reaches a finite
fraction in the limit T → 0. Thus, agents
with low threshold values have more chances
to survive. This is in agreement with the
analytical argument in Eq. 1. In scale-free
networks, the system also exhibits a power-
law distribution of the size of the avalanches
(Fig. 6). In this case, the payoff we set to
define an avalanche is Π∗ = 1.77 obtaining
an exponent τ = 1.62 for the a power-law
scaling.
Why can in the scale-free network agents
with high thresholds survive better than in a
regular or random network? To address this
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FIG. 7: Average degree d of agents having a
given threshold T when 104 agents interact in a
scale-free network. Averages are obtained over
50 realizations.
question we have analyzed the average de-
gree of the agents grouped according to their
threshold, and the results are shown in Fig. 7.
It can be seen that agents with high thresh-
old values are more likely to survive if they
are located at the hubs of the network. The
reason for this is that they can accumulate
payoff via interaction with a large number of
agents.
It is worth noting that when the network is
highly heterogeneous, for example when the
degree distribution is scale-free, the dynamics
depends on whether the payoff of each agent
is normalized by its degree. For normalized
payoffs in the scale-free networks described
previously the critical threshold depends on
the number of agents N . In the limit of
large N the critical threshold tends to 1, in
contrast to the system size independent crit-
ical threshold reported previously, and the
dynamics displays power-law distribution of
avalanches when the threshold used to define
an avalanche is chosen depending on N . A
deeper analysis of the normalized payoff case
goes beyond the scope of this paper.
IV. DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSIONS
How cooperation and altruism emerge
among individuals is a withstanding question
that has attracted much attention in the last
years. Also the relevance of the complex so-
cial organization, and the concomitant net-
work of interactions in supporting altruistic
behavior is an open question [17, 18].
We have proposed an evolutionary ultima-
tum game with local interactions that self-
organizes in a critical state. To analyze how
social structure influences the degree of coop-
eration we have considered different topolo-
gies for the network of interactions. Assum-
ing fairness as offer-acceptance around 50%,
the amount of altruistic behavior in the Ul-
timatum Game is reflected in the distribu-
tion of thresholds in the population. In reg-
ular and single-scale networks, high thresh-
olds leading to low payoffs are removed, while
intermediate thresholds are selected in the
populations. In scale-free networks, the dis-
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tribution of thresholds displays a maximum
around a value of 50%, decaying for lower and
larger threshold values. Comparing with ex-
perimental results in small societies, both set-
tings, the random and scale-free topologies,
capture the experimental findings where of-
fers around 50% are the most common. How-
ever, in the scale-free networks the distri-
bution of thresholds covers all the range of
threshold values decaying slowing from the
maximum around 50%, in contrast to the
sharp cutoff obtained in the random case.
Thus, a hierarchical social structure may ex-
plain better the patterns of offer-acceptance
found in some societies [13, 18].
From a dynamical point of view, in all the
different complex networks we have analyzed,
including regular lattices, small-world, ran-
dom and scale-free networks, the distribution
of avalanches displays a power-law scaling
with an exponent that depends on network
topology. This feature is typically a signa-
ture of self-organized criticality. Many com-
plex systems in nature are found to display
this phenomenon [4, 19]. They characterize
long-range correlations in a system, similar to
the behavior near a critical point in a phase
transition. The model introduced here can
be compared with other evolutionary mod-
els. The exponents that characterize the dy-
namics is the same as in the simple model
of evolution proposed by Bak and Sneppen
(BS model) [5]. For the one-dimensional lat-
tice, the exponents characterizing the first re-
turn time, spatial correlation and avalanche
distribution for the ultimatum model intro-
duced here are the same as for the BS-model;
for random networks, the exponent of the
avalanche size distributions corresponds to
the mean-field exponent of the BS model.
However, there is a crucial difference between
the BS-model and the one introduced here:
while in the BS-model the fitness is directly
assigned to the agents randomly from a uni-
form distribution. In our model, the fitness is
the outcome of the interactions and the dis-
tribution of thresholds is an emerging prop-
erty of it.
The results presented here complement
previous theoretical works on the emergence
of cooperation. Among the most used theo-
retical games to study the emergence of co-
operation in social sciences, the Prisoner’s
Dilemma is perhaps the most paradigmatic
example. In this model, it has been shown
that local interactions among agents can lead
to a cooperative behavior in the so-called spa-
tial games [22]. In evolutionary models, it
was also found [20] that self-organized criti-
cality can be present for this system. These
results triggered the analysis of spatial games
in different network topologies and strategies
of the agents, aiming at uncovering the condi-
tions under which cooperation can arise [32].
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In particular scale-free networks have been
shown to sustain cooperation [20]. Together
with our results, hierarchical social struc-
tures, represented for instance by scale-free
networks of interaction, suggest that primi-
tive societies displaying this kind of interac-
tions favored the emergence of altruistic be-
havior. To elucidate whether the interaction
patterns facilitated altruism or altruistic be-
havior led to complex interaction patterns we
need to incorporate more realistic ingredients
to the models as for instance the possibility
of removal and establishment of social ties
depending on the outcome of the interaction
[9]. Another open question is the evolution
of empathy itself. In this work we have as-
sumed that empathy has evolved before the
thresholds are selected. However we expect
that empathy will co-evolve simultaneously
with the thresholds. Other extensions of the
model could consider, for example, several
repeated interactions between agents before
selection. In this case, it could be argued
that a repeated interaction scheme could al-
low for an adaptation of the threshold by the
least successful agents. The interplay be-
tween adaptation and selection is an open
question to be addressed in future works.
In summary, experiments have shown that
altruistic behavior is common in human so-
cieties. Furthermore, it has been shown that
social structure is a fundamental ingredient
for understanding the distribution of shar-
ing offers in the Ultimatum Game. We show
that selection level together with local inter-
actions can lead to a critical dynamics, where
the precise degree of fair offer-acceptance de-
pends on social structure. Recent develop-
ments on complex networks has allowed us
to consider some simple models capturing ba-
sic features of networks of interaction. Our
work emphasizes the importance of consider-
ing the social structure and calls for the de-
velopment of more realistic networks models
of social interaction to understand the inter-
play between individual behavior and with
whom they interact.
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